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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s, virtually all sections of the Irish trade union movement were 
suffering, albeit to varying degrees, from the most sustained and serious 
losses in trade union membership recorded since the 1920s (Roche, 1997). 
Rising unemployment levels and falling union membership, as well as a 
mounting national fiscal crisis, provided a context for the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU) to seek a return to centralised bargaining. This has 
resulted in the conclusion of a series of tripartite social pacts (seven at the 
time of writing) since 1987.1 As a result, the government and various state 
agencies have gained direct influence over pay determination in the economy, 
while the state has effectively ‘co-opted’ federations of unions and employers 
into the process of governance (O’Donnell and Thomas, 1998). At a macro 
level, the national agreements to date have coincided with unprecedented 
economic success. Employment levels have increased dramatically, real 
increases in disposable income were delivered while keeping industrial 
conflict at low levels, tax reform has been embarked upon, and the national 
finances were transformed (Hardiman, 2004). The contents of the agreements 
have been progressively expanded, from an early focus simply on the 
questions of pay and tax reform, to the plethora of issues that now feature 
(migration, waste management, alcohol/drug misuse, housing policy, etc.).  
 
Social partnership has, therefore, for two decades, provided the framework 
within which Irish industrial relations (IR) have been conducted. While much 
literature has focused on the macro picture (particularly the economics of 
                                                 
1 Towards 2016, agreed in 2006, was signed after this research had been completed. 
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social partnership) from the perspectives of the state, employers and the trade 
union movement, the voice of the ordinary union member has been heard but 
faintly; basically, only in relation to the results of the ballots on whether to 
accept or reject the latest deal. Evidence of the satisfaction or otherwise of 
ordinary union members with the process has been virtually non-existent (cf. 
D’Art and Turner, 2002). The aim of this article is to investigate the 
perceptions of the partnership process amongst ordinary members at 
workplace level and assess the implications of these perceptions for the 
union-member relationship.2 
 
PARTNERSHIP AND UNION MEMBERS 
Union members, for various reasons, might be expected to welcome a 
partnership strategy. Firstly, recent national research shows that Irish union 
members increasingly prioritise a ‘collaborative union posture’ (Geary, 2006: 
108; see also O’ Connell et al., 2004). The incidence of industrial action has 
declined in Ireland in recent years, a phenomenon that had been observed in 
most European countries (Waddington and Hoffman, 2000), and old 
‘adversarial’ industrial relations have been castigated as destructive and 
irrelevant in the context of intensified global competition (Kelly, 1996). Thus, 
as employees are less willing or likely to engage in collective action, a 
                                                 
2 Note that this article is concerned solely with data on perceptions of the impact of the 
national partnership agreements. The national agreements from 1996 on have encouraged 
the development of partnership structures and processes at the level of the workplace. The 
evidence suggests that the diffusion of workplace partnership, as conceived of in the national 
agreements, has been quite limited (O’ Connell et al., 2004). It is most advanced in the public 
sector, and workplace partnership structures were present in the local authority in which this 
research was partly conducted. However, the two processes are distinct and the interviews 
with local authority staff revealed a clear appreciation of the distinction. The survey questions 
on partnership, too, clearly specified information was being sought on the national partnership 
process.  
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partnership strategy geared towards consensual employment relations 
reflects the demands of the contemporary workforce and may reduce the 
negative image that associates trade unions with militancy and conflict 
(Cohen and Hurd, 1998). 
 
One the main potential benefits of a national partnership strategy for unions 
might be an enhanced institutional role that provides access to power 
resources (Frege and Kelly, 2004). Greater interaction between union leaders 
and key representatives from government and business can also result in 
increased trust between the parties (Teague, 2001). In the Irish context, the 
social partnership agreements emerged around the formula of offering pay 
moderation for tax concessions, but the process has developed whereby the 
state now agrees to address broader supply side issues (training, 
infrastructure, health, housing) in conjunction with the social partners and to 
reform social and welfare policy. Trade unions, therefore, can gain influence 
over a broader range of issues that affect members’ working lives and expand 
the bargaining agenda beyond the traditional concerns of workplace pay and 
conditions (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004).  
 
In terms of pay, a corporatist strategy may find approval with union members 
who appreciate the ‘big picture’; i.e. who appreciate the benefits for the 
economy as a whole of a broader, coordinated bargaining strategy (Goetschy, 
2000). This is particularly important for unions and their members given the 
dynamics of a global economy, the growth of trans-national capital and the 
increasing power of such capital to ‘take flight’  (Streeck, 1999), which has 
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arguably resulted in escalating pressure, particularly on smaller states, to 
adopt a coordinated approach to socio-economic management (Auer, 2000). 
Finally, nationally bargained pay agreements generally seek to ensure greater 
equity in the distribution of pay increases across the economy (ibid.). 
 
Irish social partnership, however, with its high-level political exchange 
between union elites, employers and government, may be viewed as having 
negative effects on the union-member relationship. Firstly, wage restraint or 
moderation (a key plank of the process has traditionally been the exchange of 
pay moderation for tax reform) for some rank-and-file members may appear 
contrary to the raison d’ětre of trade unions (D’Art and Turner, 2002). 
Secondly, with the tendency under bargained corporatism for power to shift 
towards the union centre, local union activity may dwindle or, at least, be less 
visible to members. This could undermine the degree of articulation of the 
union regime and result in a detachment of union officials, who represent the 
union on national partnership bodies, from local representatives and ordinary 
union members; what Geary and Roche (2003) refer to as the ‘displaced 
activist’ thesis. 
 
A further problem may be members’ perceptions that the union has ‘sold out’, 
as union leaders are co-opted by employers and the state. It has been 
argued, at least in the early days of the process, that Irish ‘developmental 
corporatism’, far from being an experiment in the ‘social corporatism’ of 
countries like Sweden and Austria, with the attendant social and labour 
market objectives, amounted to little more than unions agreeing to a 
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programme of severe measures to adjust the Irish economy first to fiscal crisis 
and then to European integration (Teague, 1995)3. Thus, corporatism might 
be viewed as leading to a downgrading of membership-led and resistance 
strategies, an undermining of workplace activism, and a long-term weakening 
of union structures (D’Art and Turner, 2002; Stuart and Martίnez Lucio, 2005). 
 
Before assessing these arguments in light of empirical evidence on the impact 
of a partnership strategy on the union-member relationship, the organisations 
researched and the methods used in the study will be described. 
 
THE CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
The research, conducted throughout 2003 and 2004, consisted of case 
studies of four large, unionised organisations. The four organisations chosen 
were Bus Company (a public sector bus company, which essentially occupies 
a monopoly position in a major city), Drimeen Local Authority, People’s Bank 
(a multinational corporate bank) and Darbco (a multinational retail 
supermarket). For each, a particular case study site was chosen (a Bus 
Company garage, a Darbco store, etc).  
 
Union density rates are high in all four organisations, ranging from universal in 
both Bus Company and Darbco (where union membership is a condition of 
employment) to approximately ninety per cent in the local authority and sixty 
                                                 
3 Teague has subsequently written in a more positive vein on the partnership process; see, 
for example, Teague (2001). 
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six percent in People’s Bank.4 Only in People’s Bank has membership 
dropped in recent years (following a bitter and divisive strike in 1992; 
previously, according to union officials, density rates would have been higher; 
see below).   
 
Bus Company is a union stronghold, and transport workers have a militant 
trade union tradition, with historically high levels of strike frequency (Brannick 
et al., 1997). Traditionally, too, this has been an overwhelmingly male, full-
time, and blue-collar workforce. More recently, increasing numbers of female 
and migrant workers have been employed. Bus Company is the only 
organisation where unions actively compete for members. The study focused 
on members of the Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union 
(SIPTU; the other union recognised by Bus Company is the National Bus and 
Railworkers Union-NBRU). The percentage SIPTU/NBRU membership split is 
roughly forty/sixty at the case study site in Cubtown (with two hundred and 
thirty two SIPTU members). The NBRU has positioned itself as a vocal critic 
of the social partnership process. 
 
SIPTU was founded (following a merger of two general unions) in 1990, is the 
largest union in Ireland and represents over two hundred thousand Irish 
workers from virtually every category of employment across almost every 
sector of the Irish economy. SIPTU has been an enthusiastic supporter of the 
social partnership process; in fact, given the size of its membership, it tends to 
heavily influence the outcome of votes within Congress. Indeed, it was 
                                                 
4 Note the research focused only on union members in each organisation. 
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mentioned several times by respondents that the union was seen as ‘having 
the ear of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister)’. The Bus Company branch, 
however, voted by a margin of more than ninety per cent to reject the 2003 
partnership agreement, Sustaining Progress.  
 
The key issue facing the union at the time of the research was that of 
deregulation of the bus market (or privatisation, as many respondents saw it). 
Particularly difficult for the union was the fact that almost immediately after 
Sustaining Progress had been passed by the ICTU (with SIPTU the majority 
player) the Government announced proposals to open up the public bus 
sector to more market competition. This led to significant anger amongst 
representatives and members in the Bus Company branch. An emerging 
issue for the union was the increasing number of migrant workers in the 
company. SIPTU has been one of the most proactive unions in the country in 
terms of organising migrant employees; managing tensions on the ground 
between indigenous and migrant workers, however, was increasingly forming 
part of the local representatives’ workload.   
 
Drimeen Local Authority employs approximately twelve hundred staff and 
looks after the provision of basic services in the region in relation to roads, 
amenities, environmental services and so on. Around five hundred staff 
members are ‘outdoor’ and work in various depots around the county. The 
remaining ‘indoor staff’, on whom the research focused, work in the County 
Hall, are predominantly clerical and administrative workers, and are members 
of the public service Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT). 
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The respondents were based in the Transportation and Environment 
departments (with one exception, a clerical employee in the Human 
Resources-HR-department). Organisational structures in Drimeen LA are 
relatively hierarchical and bureaucratic, particularly in terms of staff career 
progression (seniority remains key), and employees enjoy extremely high 
levels of employment security. However recent developments reflect attempts 
to introduce more ‘consumerist’ principles to local authority work organisation 
(OECD, 1995). Increasingly, work in the sector is characterised by flexibility 
and diversity. A particular facet of employment in Drimeen LA (as in local 
government in Ireland generally) is its ‘family friendly’ and non-standard 
nature (e.g. job-sharing, part-time work), and the promotion of equality (and 
especially gender equality) in the workplace features prominently (Wickham et 
al., 2005). This explains, to a significant degree, the fact that the Drimeen 
workforce is mostly populated by females. 
 
IMPACT, formed in 1991 through the amalgamation of three unions, is 
Ireland’s largest public and civil services trade union, with a membership of 
over fifty thousand. The membership of the ‘indoor’ local government branch 
of IMPACT is white-collar, predominantly female and almost exclusively made 
up of indigenous workers. Industrial action among indoor staff is historically 
rare; the union generally tends to pursue issues through the State’s dispute 
resolution machinery. As a public service organisation, negotiations around 
pay and conditions have generally been handled at central, national level 
(with the Department of Finance a key player; Wallace et al., 2004) and this 
has continued with the partnership process. At local level, industrial relations 
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have traditionally been conducted in a rather adversarial manner. However, 
more recently workplace partnership has been seen as a key initiative for 
local government to pursue. IMPACT has been an enthusiastic supporter of 
the national partnership process and the union has endorsed all seven 
agreements to date. As with SIPTU, the union was seen as having significant 
influence (both formally and informally) with significant government players.  
 
The ongoing key issue facing unions in local government is the roll out of the 
Performance Management Development System (PMDS) which is to 
introduce ongoing employee reviews, and a greater use of competitive, merit-
based promotion systems. This explicitly links pay rises with performance, as 
all pay rises in Sustaining Progress were linked to the verification of a detailed 
modernisation and change agenda, which was agreed as part of the pay deal. 
Also, as work organisation in the sector has become characterised by a high 
degree of flexibility, a key role for the union lies in negotiating and 
implementing various family-friendly policies.  
 
Darbco is one of the world’s leading retail operators and entered the Irish 
market in the 1990s, becoming one of the sector’s largest employers. The 
case study store opened in 1989 (although it was not at the time owned by 
Darbco). There are roughly one hundred and seventy employees; no 
breakdown was available for the full-time/part-time split, but given the nature 
of the retail industry it is safe to say a considerable proportion are part-time. 
As in most modern, large-scale retail outlets (management aside) there are 
basically three areas of staff activity; customer advice and service, goods 
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handling, and checkouts and the respondents were a mix of all three groups. 
Pay grades in the company are linked to tenure of employment; staff turnover 
in the retail sector tends to be high (Caprile, 2004) but according to the store 
manager the annual staff retention target of seventy five per cent was being 
exceeded. The retail sector in Ireland (as internationally) is faced with 
increasing economic pressure related to the growing internationalisation of the 
market and multinational multiple retailers, like Darbco, are playing a leading 
role in changing working practices and industrial relations in the sector. The 
industry is very largely feminised and there is an increasing number of 
younger workers (Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff, 2005).  
 
The main trade union representing workers in the retail sector is MANDATE, 
which has about thirty six thousand members. MANDATE was formed 
(following a merger) in 1994. Given the sectors in which it operates, 
MANDATE has a membership that is predominantly female and a relatively 
large number of members work part-time (approximately seventy per cent 
according to union officials). Given the tendency in the retail sector for firms to 
compete fiercely on cost, and the sector’s adversarial industrial relations 
tradition (Caprile, 2004), the union has also been to the forefront in Ireland in 
terms of taking industrial action, with some prolonged and bitter recent 
disputes, including one with Darbco in the early part of the decade. At that 
stage IR conditions were desperately poor but, soon after, Darbco introduced 
a new HR team and, more recently, both sides have tried to pursue a more 
co-operative relationship. 
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Since its inception in 1994, MANDATE has often been characterised as an 
‘anti national agreement’ union (Caprile, 2004), has consistently argued that 
percentage increases, such as those granted under the partnership 
agreements, are of little value to its members and has sought special 
provisions for low-paid workers. Consequently, the union has consistently 
voted against partnership agreements, apart from the first agreement, the 
Programme for National Recovery. Darbco, as a member of the employer’s 
body, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), has signed up 
to the national agreements. MANDATE has, consequently, sought on 
occasion pay increases in excess of the agreed national rate (successfully in 
some cases, most notably in the wake of a strike in 2001). MANDATE has 
also been relatively proactive in terms of organising migrant workers. At the 
time of the research, a large-scale project to compile a database of the 
membership, including nationality of members and, crucially, their language 
needs, was in train. 
 
The People’s Bank branch in Suburbia, where the research was carried out, 
encompasses Lending Services, Securities, Corporate Lending and the Legal 
Department. The branch is located on a greenfield site on the outskirts of a 
major city. There are approximately two hundred People’s Bank employees 
based there (the gender split is roughly equal), of whom one hundred and 
sixty are full-time with a further forty part-time or temporary. The Irish Bank 
Officials Association (IBOA) is the leading trade union representing staff in 
Ireland’s banking and finance industry, and has a membership of over twenty 
thousand. It is, thus, the smallest union in the study and the only one that has 
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not undergone a merger in recent years. Exact figures for membership of the 
IBOA at the branch are unavailable but union informants estimate that about 
two thirds of employees are members.  
 
People’s Bank is one of the smaller banks in the state, employing just over 
seven hundred people (approximately five hundred and sixty employees are 
members of the IBOA). Although the Irish operation is relatively small, the 
bank’s parent company is one of the largest global financial service 
companies in the world. Takeover and acquisition have been features of IR at 
the bank in recent years. Having being acquired by a large MNC in the 1990s, 
the bank was again the subject of takeover rumours at the time of research 
(and has been taken over by another MNC since the research ended). 
Industrial relations at the bank have been traditionally adversarial, although 
industrial action has been limited. 
 
As with the retail sector, Irish financial services providers (traditionally 
characterised by stable, bureaucratised institutions) currently find themselves 
under particular pressure from inwardly-investing or acquiring institutions. 
National financial markets, previously protected by extensive regulation, have 
been opened up to international competition and banks have been exposed to 
new forms of price and cost pressure (Regini et al, 1999). As with retail, non-
standard work patterns are on the increase in banking organisations (due to 
the expansion of business hours, for example). Migrant workers in the sector 
tend to come from other EU, or ‘Anglo-Saxon’, countries and tend to be high-
skilled workers.  
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The IBOA has not been noted as a particularly ‘militant’ union and, at least 
until recently, has been an enthusiastic supporter of social partnership (the 
IBOA joined ICTU in 1993). Sustaining Progress, however, was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the union’s membership.  A watershed moment 
for many in the union (and, indeed, at People’s Bank) was a major national 
strike in 1992 (during which thousands of members were expelled for 
breaking IBOA directives). It seems until that point, most middle and many 
senior managers were also members of the union, but many left at that point, 
and the position subsequently is less clear-cut in relation to managers’ union 
affiliation.  
 
As can be seen from the above, then, the workplaces chosen for this 
research, while all unionised, reflect different types of organisation with 
different organisational goals and interests, and different types of employees 
with quite different work based concerns. Together, however, the workplaces 
are characterised by features that are crucial to understanding the 
contemporary trade union-member relationship. The overarching 
characteristic of these (as indeed, arguably, of all) workplaces is that they are, 
and have been, facing rapid change. The private sector workplaces are 
owned by parent MNCs (so unions must take cognisance of the dangers of 
such capital ‘taking flight’) and operate in fiercely competitive international 
markets. In the public sector, issues of deregulation, performance bench-
marking, and ‘value for money’ in the provision of public services are key. All 
the organisations are increasingly focused on the need for ‘flexibility’ in 
employment relations (for example, through greater use of part-time work, and 
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differentiated working hours) which results in concerns about work 
intensification and ‘family friendly’ work organisation. The changing nature of 
work and work patterns is reflected in the growing heterogeneity of the 
workforce, with greater participation by female, young, and migrant workers. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
As is common in case study research, a multi-method approach was adopted. 
A series of semi-structured interviews were carried out and a questionnaire 
was devised and distributed to respondents. Non-participant observation was 
possible in Bus Company and Darbco and for all four workplaces 
documentary materials on the companies, unions and workplaces were 
collated, and key informants (drawn from both union and management) were 
identified. In addition to the perspective of the union members themselves, 
information was sought from the ‘official union’ (elected workplace 
representatives, paid union officials), and the company (managers, HR 
representatives).5 Assurances of confidentiality were given to all participants.6  
 
The main qualitative research (the semi-structured interviews, documentary 
analysis and direct observation) was carried out during day-long visits 
(ranging from three to five occasions) to the workplaces. At each workplace 
the initial visit consisted of interviews with the local union representative and a 
management and/or human resource representative. At the end of these, the 
                                                 
5 Attempts to gain access to People’s Bank central management or HR proved fruitless; a key 
informant at the case study location (a senior line manager) authorised the researcher’s 
presence at that workplace. 
6 All the names of respondents, organisations and places used are pseudonyms. Permission 
to identify the trade unions was granted. 
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respondents were asked to each suggest employees to be interviewed (the 
intention, obviously, being to attempt to avoid bias in the sample). Each 
interviewee, in turn, was asked to similarly nominate another possible 
candidate (‘snowballing’).7 All employees were interviewed at their place of 
work (the staff canteen, social area, or in vacant offices). Union officials and 
company central management were interviewed at the union or company 
head office. 
 
In all, fifty nine qualitative interviews were conducted, tape recorded and 
transcribed. These ranged in duration from around forty minutes (the bulk of 
the interviews with ordinary union members) to two hours (some of the key 
informant interviews with union officials and HR representatives). These 
consisted of forty one interviews with ordinary union members (nine bus 
drivers, twelve retail workers, ten bank workers, and ten local authority 
workers), five with workplace union representatives (two from Bus Company, 
one from each of the other workplaces), five with union officials (two each 
from SIPTU and MANDATE and one from the IBOA), two with workplace 
mangers (Bus Company and Darbco), four with HR representatives (two from 
Bus Company, one from Darbco and Drimeen LA), one with a member of 
LANPAG and one Local Authority Partnership Facilitator. 
 
                                                 
7 In order to make the sample as representative of the workplace population as possible, 
several respondents were simply approached randomly, based on their age, gender, or, when 
discovered, employment status (e.g. part-time). So, for example, in Bus Company only one of 
the respondents was female (approximately three per cent of Bus Company’s workforce is 
female); in Darbco, by contrast, three-quarters (nine) of the respondents were female, better 
reflecting the composition of the retail workforce. 
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The questionnaire was administered at the end of the research period. For 
practical reasons (time and cost) and due to the fact the workplaces varied in 
the numbers of those employed, the aim was to distribute one hundred 
questionnaires in each workplace.8  Darbco, having initially agreed to 
cooperate with the research, expressed misgivings about the survey 
questionnaire, and the level of detail contained therein. Eventually, the 
company agreed to allow fifty copies be distributed.9 In all, three hundred and 
sixty surveys were distributed (one hundred in each workplace bar Darbco). 
One hundred and twenty nine responses were received, giving a response 
rate of thirty six per cent10. The study, therefore, is relatively small-scale and 
any generalisation is not primarily about the typicality of the organisations, but 
the existence of particular processes, which may influence behaviours and 
actions in the organisations. 
 
PAY AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE 
Across the four workplaces there was agreement amongst virtually all Full-
Time Officers (FTOs) and workplace representatives that the partnership 
process had benefited members in terms of pay. The only equivocal voices 
were the two MANDATE officials, who felt that the agreements were of little 
                                                 
8 The surveys were distributed randomly; the vast majority were handed directly to employees 
(as above, with the objective of representing the workplace population). A small number were 
given to interview respondents to be passed on to colleagues or left on desks/lockers of 
employees with a note explaining the context. Although randomly distributed, the survey 
responses reflected well the profiles of the workplaces; for example, Bus Company 
respondents were mostly male and in their forties; retail respondents were mostly female, with 
a third aged under thirty. 
9 A further ten were distributed discreetly by interview respondents. 
10 The response rate for Darbco (at just over fifty per cent) was significantly higher than the 
other workplaces (which ranged from thirty one to thirty four per cent). As a result of fewer 
surveys being distributed there, ultimately between thirty one and thirty four surveys per 
workplace were received. 
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benefit to members in low-paid industries, like retail. Interestingly the 
workplace representative had a different view: 
 
‘I think partnership is probably better than the free collective bargaining 
because everybody just goes off looking for more and more then…I’m 
not saying we shouldn’t get paid, we want a pay rise but we don’t want 
to push the company so far…You could just cut your nose off to spite 
your face and put yourself out of work’ (Liam, MANDATE workplace 
representative).  
 
At the core of Liam’s view is the desirability of industrial stability. This was 
stressed by most of the workplace representatives. For the latter, the removal 
of the wages issue from local negotiations also meant the removal of the most 
contentious local agenda item: 
 
‘A lot of contentious issues, like your wages, are taken out of your 
hands now. One of the main reasons for going on strike would be your 
wages, you know? So, that’s not an issue when it’s done on a national 
level’ (Donal, SIPTU workplace representative) 
 
Union members across the four workplaces were asked a number of survey 
questions about the impact of social partnership. As can be seen from Table 
1, survey respondents were strongly of the view that pay and conditions for 
workers had improved as a result of the partnership agreements. 
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Table 1. Pay and conditions have improved for Irish workers as a result 
of social partnership  
 Strongly 
agree/agree 
Undecided Disagree/Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
Financial 
Services 
74 3 24 100 
Retail 
 
69 14 17 100 
Bus 
 
77 3 19 100 
Local 
Authority 
84 13 3 100 
Total 
 
76 8 16 100 
N=126 (figures may not add to 100 due to rounding) 
 
The interview data also, interestingly, revealed significant appreciation by 
ordinary members of the desirability of industrial stability: 
 
‘When the unions in this company and in other companies were doing 
their own thing, breaking away and having ballots and having 
stoppages, they held to country to actual ransom. That doesn’t happen 
anymore because everybody is part of one big club’ (Dominic, SIPTU 
member). 
 
An interesting observation by some of the higher-paid financial services 
employees was that the national pay deals promoted equity: 
 
‘I’m all in favour of protecting the weak…ok, it (centralised pay 
bargaining) penalises the strong but, say you’re going to get fifteen per 
cent of an increase through partnership. If you’re good it’s quite easy to 
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get twenty per cent, but if you’re bad it’s very hard to get fifteen’ 
(Eoghan, IBOA member). 
 
Across the workplaces, then, there was broad agreement among members, 
workplace representatives and (most) officials on the success of the 
partnership process in terms of pay outcomes. This seems to question the 
criticism of partnership/corporatism that focuses on wage moderation at ‘top’ 
level being resisted on the ground (D’Art and Turner, 2002). This might well 
reflect the view that members have a more sophisticated understanding of the 
arguments for wage moderation, and the links with other claims, than is often 
thought, and appreciate the benefits of a broader, coordinated bargaining 
strategy (Goetschy, 2000). The references to the desirability of industrial 
stability and the role of partnership in promoting that seem to support this 
view. As noted above, the organisational context for these workers was one of 
rapid change (possible deregulation, takeover, organisational restructuring 
etc). In such circumstances, it may be that partnership is seen as a ‘safety 
net’ of sorts.  
 
INFLUENCE, UNION POWER, AND THE ‘BROADER AGENDA’ 
As noted above, one of the potential benefits of a partnership strategy is the 
opportunity for the union movement to better institutionalise its position in 
social, economic and political life and to gain influence over a broader range 
of issues affecting members’ working lives. This was alluded to by most of the 
respondent FTOs, particularly those representing members in the two public 
sector workplaces. One advantage of the process was mentioned in relation 
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to union influence over the decisions of key state agencies. An example given 
was the granting of contracts for road building by the National Roads 
Authority:  
 
‘We’d know who’s in to tender for those, we would have made contact 
and met them, and made sure that we had an agreement with them 
that they would be unionised and sub-contractors would be unionised’ 
(Alan, SIPTU official). 
 
Perhaps surprisingly (in light of the ‘displaced activist’ and ‘incorporation/sell-
out’ theses) most of the workplaces representatives also made reference to 
the benefits of their union leadership having access to, and an influence on, 
senior employer and State representatives: 
 
‘Partnership (involves) horse-trading and that’s what senior union 
officials are for…There is a big element of trust in that. At the level 
where (the General Secretary of IMPACT) talks to (the Minister for 
Finance) and his mandarins it works very well. I can picture them all 
having a grand chat about pensions and all that stuff; important stuff 
really. People don’t realise how important this stuff is, but if you look at 
England, you see the mess that’s been made of pensions over there’ 
(Brendan, IMPACT workplace representative).  
 
Opinion on this issue was more divided among the private sector FTOs. One 
MANDATE official stressed the advantages of being ‘at the table’ in relation to 
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strategic issues relevant to the retail trade. One example given was in relation 
to the issue of immigrant workers in the sector: 
 
‘I think we’ve convinced the Minister during the national pay talks that 
the permit system has been widely abused by a lot of employers’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
However, other officials were not so convinced and expressed reservations 
about the motives of both employers and, intriguingly, the State for entering 
the partnership process:  
 
‘The employers and the IBEC don’t enter into it in the true spirit of what 
was meant and I think that’s probably been one of the problems with all 
the programmes’ (David, IBOA official). 
 
This was categorically endorsed in the context of the retail sector by the other 
MANDATE official: 
 
‘What the unions want is a civilised relationship, decent working 
conditions and not war, war, war everyday. What employers want is 
peace, industrial peace, and “let us do what we like” at the same time. 
And what government wants is industrial peace and they don’t give a 
damn much after that what happens to anybody. So we don’t all want 
the same things…If we all wanted (partnership) on a “what kind of a 
society do we want to build?” approach, rather than the system that 
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says “well, give them another three per cent if it shuts them up”, it 
might work a little bit better’ (Eric, MANDATE official).   
 
In both case, the officials doubted the bona fides of the other social partners, 
and felt that the process was being used by employers and the State primarily 
to manage levels of industrial conflict rather than to genuinely address, 
through partnership, broader concerns about macro socio-economic policy.  It 
is interesting to note that such views were not expressed to the same degree 
by the public sector union representatives. 
 
The union officials were also asked for their view of members’ perceptions of 
the partnership process. The responses were generally quite negative. The 
officials from SIPTU and MANDATE felt that the process had not been 
beneficial for the union-member relationship:  
 
‘I do think that centralised bargaining has damaged involvement to a 
great extent. I mean, every three years you get a bit of paper and you 
stick “yes” or you stick “no” on it, as most of our members do, and you 
hop it in the box. And to a great extent that’s the height of your 
involvement with social partnership’ (Eric, MANDATE official). 
 
A related issue was that of the non-pay elements of the social partnership 
agreements (the extremely extensive ‘social provisions’, for example). Again, 
officials felt that the value of these was not appreciated by the membership, 
although the officials did themselves recognise some failure on their part to 
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effectively ‘sell’ the broader social elements of the partnership process to 
members. This aspect seems one of the key complexities at the heart of how 
partnership has impacted on the union member relationship. As Table 2 
shows, a clear majority of employees across the four workplaces felt that the 
union movement did have a greater role in influencing state social and 
economic policy as a result of the process (although there is a high number of 
‘undecided’ respondents). This is a key question as part of the rationale for 
unions entering a partnership process is to enhance their institutional security 
and expand the bargaining agenda.  
 
Table 2. Trade unions have more influence on Irish social and economic 
policy as a result of social partnership 
 Strongly 
agree/agree 
Undecided Disagree/Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
Financial 
Services 
56 24 21 100 
Retail 
 
45 28 28 100 
Bus 
 
45 26 26 100 
Local 
Authority 
41 56 3 100 
Total 
 
47 34 19 100 
N=126 (figures may not add to 100 due to rounding) 
 
However, what the interview data revealed is that, outside of the pay element, 
the majority of respondents had very little knowledge of the role of partnership 
in addressing key issues of concern to their working lives. As noted above 
these workplaces all face both common, and certain distinctive, challenges. 
Under Part Two of Sustaining Progress (the agreement on which respondents 
were being, or just had been, balloted at the time of the research) section 6 
deals with housing, section 10 with workplace legislation and codes (including 
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atypical work), sections 11 and 12 deal with the gender pay gap and work/life 
balance, section 18 deals with migrant workers and sections 20-26 deal with 
public sector reform. These were all issues of importance for these 
workplaces and respondents, yet virtually none of the latter was aware that 
such issues were being addressed through the partnership process at all 
(much less in the agreement on which they were voting).11  
 
To take one example, most of the respondents made reference to the high 
cost of housing as something that impacted on their working lives (because 
they were forced into long commutes, for example). Many of the female (and 
some of the male) respondents referred to the high cost of childcare. The 
respondents’ confusion as to the role of partnership is neatly illustrated by this 
female IMPACT member: 
 
‘There’s a big housing crisis. There are loads of other issues like 
childcare, which to me, don’t really have anything to do with, well 
maybe they do, I don’t know, with the actual percentage increases. As 
well, there’s the Performance Related Pay. I don’t know how that’s 
going to be implemented’.  
 
The whole area of performance related pay and PMDS in the public sector 
had been negotiated as part of the overall pay package, yet none of the local 
authority respondents was aware of this fact.  
 
                                                 
11 The issue of how adequately partnership addresses such issues is, of course, a different 
matter.  
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One area where ordinary SIPTU members, however, were quite conscious of 
the, as they saw it, failings of the process was in relation to transport policy. 
Despite the establishment of a public transport forum between the various 
social partners under the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF), the 
Irish government was determined to press ahead with deregulation (what 
most bus drivers saw as privatisation) of the city’s bus service. There was 
deep frustration amongst the workplace representatives and ordinary 
members at Bus Company that the union had drawn back from threatened 
industrial action, on the basis, as they saw it, of their responsibilities as a 
social partner. There was considerable anger amongst the drivers, who felt 
that the government had been disingenuous in its negotiations over 
Sustaining Progress. In fact, above all this was the main reason behind the 
overwhelming rejection by Bus Company employees of Sustaining Progress; 
respondents commented on the feeling they had been sold a ‘pig-in-a-poke’. 
A feeling existed amongst most Bus Company respondents that SIPTU, as 
the country’s largest general union and one of the main advocates of social 
partnership, had become compromised in terms of pursuing industrial action 
by virtue of its status as a key social partner and that social partnership was 
being used merely as a fig leaf for the government to pursue its goals while 
avoiding industrial strife. Respondents were frustrated that, despite the fact 
that the union had an overwhelming mandate for strike action, this was not 
being pursued: 
 
‘We’re not happy with the union, because they’ve delayed the strike, 
which I think is stupid. They have the backing of the whole garage.  
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Unfortunately, there are certain guidelines (on taking strike action) that 
you have to take from the PPF agreements’ (Harry, SIPTU member). 
 
Finally, a related feature of the lack of knowledge of the non-pay elements of 
the partnership agreements was the association by a minority of respondents 
of the union movement with a (somewhat discredited) ‘establishment’. The 
potential problem of the ‘official’ union (and in particular its full-time officers) 
becoming incorporated into, and associated with, the social networks of 
employers, state agencies and the middle classes (lawyers, bankers etc) is by 
no means new (Kelly and Heery, 1994) but is probably heightened under a 
corporatist framework. Thus, a minority of respondents responded to 
questions about partnership by quickly segueing into complaints about the 
government, the State, and others: 
 
‘I would also strongly criticise the government for their 
waste…the builders, the property developers, the banks and the 
government. Stamp duty. VAT. The cost of the tribunals. There’s 
21% VAT on the lawyers fees. …So, social partnership me arse’ 
(Carla, MANDATE member). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The data here reveal quite a complex interaction between the social 
partnership process and the union-member relationship. Broadly speaking, 
union members in this research (across all four workplaces) were favourably 
disposed towards partnership as a union strategy. This was particularly true in 
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terms of pay outcomes, the role of partnership in promoting more stable, 
peaceable employment relations and the benefits of a co-ordinated approach 
to macro socio-economic policy, that links wage moderation with job creation 
and retention. Members also felt the process had resulted in more trade union 
influence over socio-economic policy. However, the data also show that the 
vast majority of members had very little knowledge of what I have termed the 
‘broader agenda’ aspect of partnership; outside of pay and industrial conflict, 
members had little understanding of other policy aspects of the process, even 
where (in areas like childcare, housing, public sector reform, etc) these were 
issues of concern that had a significant impact on their working lives. Union 
workplace representatives, too, were by and large positive about the process 
and welcomed the removal of contentious items (most obviously, pay) from 
the local bargaining agenda.  
 
Given this it is interesting to reflect on the fact that in three of these 
workplaces (the exception being the local authority) members voted, around 
the time of the research, to reject Sustaining Progress.12 The key explanation 
for this in the private sector workplaces would, it is submitted, seem to be 
found in the stance of the official union. In both Darbco and People’s Bank the 
respective unions recommended a ‘no’ vote.13 In both cases, union officials 
(and in the latter case, the workplace representative) indicated a significant 
reason for the recommendation related to the ‘binding arbitration’ aspect of 
                                                 
12 Information on the precise voting outcomes in the four workplaces was unavailable; 
however, MANDATE, the IBOA and the Bus Company branch of SIPTU (in the latter case, 
the information comes from the FTOs) all overwhelmingly rejected the agreement, with ‘no’ 
votes of between ninety and ninety five per cent. It is reasonable to infer (see note 13) that 
voting patterns in these workplaces did not deviate significantly from the overall pattern. 
13 More than half of interview respondents in each workplace indicated they would usually 
follow the union recommendation when voting. 
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the agreement. Two binding arbitration procedures were introduced as part of 
Sustaining Progress; pay compliance clauses and the provisions of the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004 relating to disputes over 
union representation. Thus, although the parties are ostensibly free to reject 
the conciliation stage of these procedures, they both ultimately contain 
binding mechanisms to bring finality to disputes.  However, the binding 
arbitration question was not an issue that exercised ordinary members at all.14 
Binding arbitration was also an issue for the Bus Company workplace 
representatives, but there, as illustrated above, the most compelling 
explanation for the ‘no’ vote related to the burning issue of deregulation.15 The 
IMPACT leadership recommended a ‘yes’ vote, which was comfortably 
endorsed by the membership.  
 
Thus, it would seem that the stance taken by the official union is highly 
significant in terms of voting outcomes, a point that D’Art and Turner (2002), 
in their research on the attitudes of members of the anti-partnership 
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU) to the 
process, also make. This is, perhaps, understandable in light of the confusion, 
or lack of knowledge, of most members in relation to much of what is 
contained within the non-pay provisions of the agreements. It does beg the 
question, however, as to why the official unions here seem unable (or 
unwilling?) to better explain the workings and outcomes of the process to their 
                                                 
14 Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the union movement in general, and SIPTU in particular, 
has been quite happy to utilise binding arbitration in the context of representation disputes 
under the 2001-2004 Acts; see Doherty (2007). 
15 Note that at the end of 2007, deregulation (while still being avowed state policy) has not 
occurred to any real extent. 
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membership? In the case of Bus Company, a significant union campaign 
against deregulation seems to have resulted in members being extremely 
cognisant of the role of the social partnership process in relation to transport 
policy. In the case of the local authority, however, the link between public 
sector reform (especially PRP and PMDS) and partnership was not apparent 
to members at all. One (rather cynical) explanation, adapted from Oxenbridge 
and Brown (2004), might be that the IMPACT leadership had little interest in 
explaining to members their role in negotiating what may be seen as painful 
concessions for public sector workers (performance appraisals, pay rises 
linked to delivery of an agreed reform agenda and so on).  
 
However, this does not explain why union leaders have not been able to 
outline to members the potential benefits, or indeed weaknesses, of many of 
the non-pay partnership provisions outlined above. The interviews with union 
officials, even those relatively supportive of the process, seemed to indicate 
unease with how they felt the process was viewed by members. It seems odd, 
though, for union officials to bemoan the members’ lack of engagement with 
the partnership process, while making little attempt to explain it more fully. 
The officials’ unease seems misplaced in relation to these workplaces, as the 
data indicate that members (and to a lesser, but still significant extent, 
workplace representatives) are relatively comfortable with a partnership 
strategy. This may suggest an interesting inversion of the classic corporatist 
critique, and raises questions as to the extent to which, on the partnership 
issue, the leaders of these unions are responding to the preferences of their 
membership.  
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